Though weaker at the most extreme versions, greater Democratic control of lawmaking institutions is associated with more big cuts.
Appendix B provides robustness checks of the primary models in the paper treating the number of Democratic lawmaking institutions as a factor variable. Relative to the baseline of holding one institution, Democratic control of both two and three institutions are positive and statistically significant in all specifications for Increase and Big Cut. As in the primary model specifications, these effects occur only in the first session of a Congress.
Appendix C provides an interaction between the number of Democratically controlled institutions and Democratically owned subaccounts, along with a three-way interaction with the second session of a Congress. The results emphasize the finding in the paper that the accuracy corrections seen by Democrats making large cuts are most apparent on issues owned by the Democratic Party.
Appendix D provides a robustness check of the primary models in the paper separating control of the number of congressional chambers held by Democrats and Democratic presidents. In contrast to a compromise story, which would predict that big cuts may be driven by Democratic Congresses with Republican Presidents, the effect of both the number of chambers controlled by Democrats and the Democratic President term are both positive.
Appendix E provides a robustness check of Figure 1 in the paper separating out all observed constellations of party control over the 47 year period of analysis. Regardless of which branch is controlled by Democrats, controlling only one branch is associated with fewer large cuts relative to the cases when Democrats control either two or three lawmaking institutions. 0.21 0.21 0.14 0.10 Standard errors in parentheses. ^p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 0.62 0.33 0.28 0.15 Standard errors in parentheses. ^p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Note: Multi-level logistic models allowing the intercept to vary by subaccount. Dependent variable definitions are as follows: "Change" (1 if the nominal percentage change is larger than +/-3%, 0 otherwise); "Increase" (1 if the subaccount changed and had a positive change or a subaccount inception, 0 if subaccount changed and had a negative change); "Big Cut" (1 if the subaccount was cut more than 50%, 0 if cut less than/equal to 50%); "Big Increase" (1 if the subaccount was increased more than 50% or created (inception), 0 if increased less than/equal to 50%). Note: Multi-level logistic models allowing the intercept to vary by subaccount. Dependent variable definitions are as follows: "Change" (1 if the nominal percentage change is larger than +/-3%, 0 otherwise); "Increase" (1 if the subaccount changed and had a positive change or a subaccount inception, 0 if subaccount changed and had a negative change); "Big Cut" (1 if the subaccount was cut more than 50%, 0 if cut less than/equal to 50%); "Big Increase" (1 if the subaccount was increased more than 50% or created (inception), 0 if increased less than/equal to 50%).
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